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Introduction
In the context of the 2013 retirement income review (CFLRI, 
2013), Kathryn Maloney and Malcolm Menzies from the 
Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income 
put the question to me: what does ‘a fair go’ mean in public 
policy?1 I mentioned this in a chance conversation with Colin 
James, who suggested tackling the question in an active, 
verbal sense (‘a fair go’), rather than attempting to elaborate 
on ‘fairness’ as an abstract noun. Consequently, this paper 
does not propose ‘a theory of fairness’ as a proxy for, say, a 
theory of distributive justice, or a theory of social justice, 
even a non-ideal theory of justice (cf. Arvan, 2014; Simmons, 
2010). My aim is more modest: to provide a framework for 
public reasoning in contexts where there is argument across 
the political spectrum about whether a public policy gives 
people who are affected by it ‘a fair go’.  This approach is 
based on three assumptions. 
1. A great deal of public policy-making 
involves arguments about who gets 
what, when and how, relative to 
others, and who pays (cf. Laswell, 
1950).
2. These arguments take place within a 
society that exhibits deep diversity, 
including a plurality of values. People 
do not necessarily want, or value, the 
same things to the same extent, in 
the same way (Bromell, 2009a).2 
3 There is not and never will be a 
perfectly just world, or a perfect 
social system, or a perfect set 
of institutional arrangements 
and regulations. As Sen (2009) 
has argued, we need to abandon 
pretensions to ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’ and focus instead 
on advancing justice, rather 
than perfecting it. He proposes 
‘government by discussion’: the 
exchange of public reasons to arrive 
at partial rankings and limited 
agreements about practicable options 
to make life better for people than it 
is now.
Etzioni (2014) has similarly urged us 
to view public policy as a fixer-upper, 
rather than a new construction. Policy-
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making is less about defining a goal, 
considering options to get there and 
implementing the most cost-effective 
option than it is about asking what can 
be done with the conditions we have 
been given and the unfolding trends we 
may ride, and working out how we might 
make things better than they are now, 
within the resources at our command. 
Thus the argument that follows is based 
on a further (fourth) assumption:
4 The vast majority of public servants, 
whether elected or appointed, 
enter public life not for the naked 
exercise of power, nor predominantly 
to satisfy and advance our own 
interests, but because we want to 
make a difference and improve 
outcomes for our fellow citizens as 
well as ourselves.
Making sense of moral judgements
Something of a consensus has emerged 
in recent years between anthropologists, 
animal behaviourists, psychologists, 
neuroscientists, game theorists and 
behavioural economists that a concern 
for fairness is a ‘wired’ trait in humans 
(Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2003; Gazzaniga, 2005; Pfaff, 
2007; Hausman, 2008; Crockett, 2009; 
Corning, 2011). This trait has also been 
found to exist, at least rudimentarily, in 
some non-human primates (Brosnan and 
de Waal, 2003; Bräuer and Hanus, 2012). 
The norm of fairness seems to be universal, 
and a product of both nature and nurture, 
like the acquisition of language. Like 
language, development occurs as children 
mature from reliance on simple decision 
rules (equal shares, taking turns, tossing 
a coin, drawing straws) to more complex 
considerations of age, merit, social 
relationships and ‘us/them’ distinctions, 
all shaped by the values, customs, rules, 
stories and practices of a given society 
(Almås et al., 2010; Corning, 2011, p.7).
Corning (2011) concludes that 
‘altruistic sharing backed by a threat of 
punishment for selfish violations is a 
fundamental element of human nature, 
coupled with the strong expectation for 
reciprocity from others’. Accordingly, 
he argues that ‘the standard neoclassical 
economics model of a rational, 
calculating, acquisitive economic man 
(Homo economicus) is a caricature that 
obscures a much more complex reality’ 
(Corning, 2011, pp.9, 82; cf. Sen, 1977).
In other words, the moral judgement 
‘that’s not fair’ is first a feeling, an 
emotional reaction, voiced as an 
objection to an actual or proposed state 
of affairs or distribution of benefits and 
costs. Emotions play a more prominent 
role in social decision-making than we 
often care to admit (Sanfey, 2007; cf. 
Hume, 1777, part I, opening para.). As 
Haidt (2012, p.48) puts it, ‘Moral reasons 
are the tail wagged by the intuitive dog’. 
We characteristically proceed from 
an emotion or intuition to a moral 
judgement (‘fair enough’/‘that’s not fair’). 
Only when we ourselves have second 
thoughts, or are challenged by others, do 
we apply reasoning, somewhat after the 
fact, in order to explain and justify our 
moral judgements to ourselves and to 
others. 
I have argued elsewhere (Bromell, 
2012) that public policy-making needs 
to go beyond ostensibly ‘values-free’, 
empirical analysis of ‘the evidence’ and 
‘what works’, and find ways to engage in 
co-production with citizens of the sort 
that factors into policy making explicit 
critical reflection and public deliberation 
on purpose, values and emotions. 
Freiberg and Carson similarly invite us 
to recognise emotion and affect within 
‘a reasoned and open dialogic process of 
policy formulation’ (Freiberg and Carson, 
2010,  p.161).
A Kiwi preoccupation  
A ‘wired’ concern for fairness is amplified 
in the New Zealand context by a cultural 
preoccupation with ‘a fair go’ that is 
reflected in everyday habits of thought 
and speech: a fair go, fair play, fair share, 
fair enough, fair game, a fair shake of the 
sav, fair’s fair. Consider, for example, the 
extraordinary longevity of the consumer 
affairs television programme Fair Go, 
which first screened in 1977 and is one 
of New Zealand’s longest running and 
highest rating programmes.
On a visit to New Zealand, historian 
David Fischer noticed how frequently 
New Zealanders talk about fairness, 
and reflected on his fellow Americans’ 
characteristic preoccupation with liberty 
or freedom. In an extended comparative 
study (Fischer, 2012), he explains this in 
two ways. First, the United States and New 
Zealand are products of different waves 
of imperial expansion, in reaction to 
different social conditions and pressures. 
The United States was settled in the 17th 
century by people who felt themselves to 
be victims of tyranny and persecution. 
Consequently they elevated the principle 
of liberty.3 New Zealand on the other 
hand, was settled in the 19th century by 
people who felt they were victims less of 
tyranny than of social injustice and gross 
inequity. Consequently they elevated the 
principle of fairness.
Secondly, the US and New Zealand 
afforded different material conditions. 
In the US, many Americans continue 
to have a sense of boundlessness and 
opportunity (‘Go west, young man!’), of 
living in ‘the land of the free’ in a universe 
without limits. In New Zealand the young 
nation quickly ran up against resource 
constraints. Climate and soil were not 
as kindly as first thought, and survival 
depended on developing cultural norms, 
social practices and political institutions 
to encourage and enable fairness, sharing 
and redistribution. Anne Salmond notes, 
for example, that:
In their dislike of the aristocratic 
monopoly of land and waterways 
The notion of ‘a fair go’ is, of course, relevant not 
only to retirement income policy ... but also to 
matters as diverse as poverty, income inequality 
and redistribution
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at home, the settlers fought for the 
establishment of the Queen’s Chain, 
and made successive attempts to 
break up large estates. Part of their 
legacy is the idea of the ‘fair go’, a 
powerful motif in our society, along 
with a marked dislike of arrogance 
and pretension. (Salmond, 2012, p.4)
Policy relevance and political rhetoric
The notion of ‘a fair go’ is, of course, 
relevant not only to retirement income 
policy – the context in which the question 
was first put to me – but also to matters as 
diverse as poverty, income inequality and 
redistribution (Rashbrooke, 2013; Stiglitz, 
2013); education; housing; health care and 
medical rationing (Koch, 2002), including 
access to pharmaceuticals (Coyle, 2012); 
settlement of historic Treaty of Waitangi 
grievances; sentencing guidelines; resource 
management, including the use of fresh 
water; risk management in the use of 
new technologies (McComas and Besley, 
2011); and the sale of shares in state-
owned assets (Salmond, 2013). Fairness is 
critical for the stability and sustainability 
of public policy (Alesina and Angeletos, 
2005, p.974). If regulation is perceived to 
be fair, it is more likely to win cross-party 
support and less likely to be subsequently 
amended or repealed.
Given its currency as a vernacular 
concept in New Zealand, political 
rhetoric commonly appeals to ‘a fair go’. 
For example, ‘a fair go for the ordinary 
[or ‘decent’] bloke’ was a favourite slogan 
of ‘Rob’s Mob’ and Sir Robert Muldoon 
when he was prime minister and leader 
of the National Party from 1975 to 1984. 
(Perhaps it is fortunate that ‘Rob’s Mob’ 
did not elaborate on its aspirations for 
‘the ordinary woman’.) The 1986  Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System 
identified ten criteria for evaluating 
electoral systems, with many involving 
‘fairness’ – to Mäori, to ethnic minorities 
and to political parties: ‘For New 
Zealanders an electoral system – and, 
more broadly, a political system, or a set 
of government policies – is defensible 
only if seen to be “fair”’ (Levine, 2012).
More recently, the words ‘fair’, ‘unfair’, 
‘fairness’ and ‘fairly’ were used 74 times 
in political party election manifestos in 
2011, an increase of 68% over their use in 
the 2008 election.
While questions are increasingly 
asked about whether New Zealanders do 
indeed get ‘a fair go’ (Kilgallon, 2013), 
the concept of fairness still resonates and 
continues to be used in political rhetoric. 
For example, David Clark, candidate 
and subsequently (following the 2011 
election) MP for Dunedin North, wrote a 
blog post in August 2010 that argued:
The reason people choose to stay 
in New Zealand, or return to New 
Zealand, is tied up with the type of 
society we have. People love New 
Zealand because they feel at home 
here. You and I value access for 
everyone to quality health care. All 
New Zealanders value schools that 
are safe with dedicated teachers, and 
an education system that delivers 
quality results for our kids. These 
values are rooted in the fact that 
New Zealanders have an underlying 
sense of fairness. It is what makes 
New Zealanders tick. We love to see 
everyone having a fair go. Our pride 
in our identity as New Zealanders 
is tied up with a sense of fairness. 
(Clark, 2010)
In everyday discourse and in political 
rhetoric, New Zealanders seem to appeal 
more commonly to ‘a fair go’ than to 
‘rights’ or to some or other theory of 
justice. This may have wider significance. 
The notion of ‘a fair go’ appears to bridge 
a gap between more abstract accounts 
of political principles and the actual 
beliefs – and actions – of political actors 
(Klosko, 1992, p.xii). As Sen notes, ‘we 
have good reason to be persuaded by 
Rawls that the pursuit of justice has to 
be linked to – and in some sense derived 
from – the idea of fairness’, which is 
foundational and in some sense prior to 
development of principles of justice (Sen, 
2009, p.54). It may be more productive, 
therefore, to think critically about what 
‘a fair go’ means in public policy and to 
structure policy debate in these terms, 
than to attempt to assess or justify policy 
options in terms of ‘rights’ (Walzer, 1981; 
cf. Geiringer and Palmer, 2003, 2007) 
or by appeal to some or other theory of 
justice. 
While New Zealanders seem to 
value the idea of ‘a fair go’, we do not 
often pause, however, to bring to this 
explicit critical reflection or to clarify 
what ‘a fair go’ means in public policy 
(Kerr, 2005, p.23). The remainder of this 
article provides a framework for public 
reasoning and comparative assessment of 
‘a fair go’ in public policy.
Context, relationships, time
The framework I propose is designed to 
facilitate an exchange of public reasons 
where there is argument about what ‘a fair 
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Figure 1:  Occurrence of ‘fair’ and its cognates in 2008 and 2011 general election 
party manifestos4
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go’ means in relation to a specific policy or 
set of policies. It is important, therefore, 
to clarify at the outset the context, 
relationships and temporal dimensions of 
the policy problem. What is fair depends 
on the people who are the participants, 
and their relationships and interactions 
within a specific context at a particular 
point in time (Corning, 2011, p.19; 
Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011, p.234):
Context: In what context has the 
question of ‘a fair go’ arisen? What 
do we want to change? What are 
the goals (outcomes) and objectives 
(results) we want to achieve?
Relationships: Who are the key 
‘stakeholders’ (interested and affected 
parties)? What is the nature of the 
relationship between them? Are there 
existing agreements, contracts or 
treaties between the parties?
Time: What time constraints do 
we face? What time trends can 
we observe, and what are the 
implications of those trends now 
and in the future? How are costs and 
benefits currently allocated between 
past, present and future generations?
Fair process
The next stage in my argument is to 
consider, in the context of public policy-
making in a liberal democracy, what ‘a 
fair go’ requires procedurally, because 
‘how things work’ is as important as ‘what 
works’. The procedures that govern public 
services, and the perceived fairness of 
how rules are set and implemented, can 
significantly determine public responses: 
‘These responses can condition trust in 
public services, and determine how willing 
people are to cooperate with service 
providers: cooperation that, in turn, can 
be crucial to achieving the objectives of a 
service’ (Pearce, 2007, p.11). Fair process 
requires impartiality (equal consideration 
of interests), deliberative fairness (how 
the rules are set), transactional fairness 
(how the rules are operationalised – 
and playing by the rules once set) and 
transitional fairness (how rules are revised 
or repealed, and the timing of policy 
implementation).
Impartiality
Impartiality declines to introduce private 
considerations into decisions that should 
be made on public grounds (Barry, 1995, 
p.13). It respects equality of moral worth, 
equal consideration of interest – i.e. 
‘democratic equality’ (Anderson, 1999) – 
and principles of natural justice. Justitia 
wears a blindfold when she weighs our 
competing interests and passes judgement. 
Everyone counts for one, and none counts 
for more than one – a foundational, and 
at the time radical, idea in Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. 
Impartiality is why we have due 
process, and formal separation of powers 
between the monarch or head of state, the 
legislature and the judiciary. Impartiality 
is why public sector ethics matters. There 
is, or should be, no place in public policy 
for mates’ rates, special access to decision 
makers and backroom deals. 
Fairness as impartiality precludes 
permanent special group rights, including 
special political representation based 
on ancestry or ethnic identity (Bromell, 
2008, 2009a, 2009b). As Brian Barry 
argues in presenting his theory of justice 
as impartiality:
The underlying assumption here 
is that claims to special advantages 
based simply upon membership of 
a certain bloodline, ethnic group 
or race are too transparently self-
serving to form a basis of agreement 
that others can seriously be asked 
to assent to. More deeply, the 
whole idea that we should seek the 
agreement of everybody rests upon 
a fundamental commitment to the 
equality of all human beings. (Barry, 
1995, p.8)
Deliberative fairness
Secondly, ‘a fair go’ requires deliberative 
fairness, which is about how the rules are 
set. Deliberative fairness is why we have 
democracy, or government by discussion, 
in which eligible citizens and permanent 
residents participate in the proposal, 
development and creation of laws, either 
directly, or indirectly through the free and 
fair election of representatives. 
Deliberative fairness requires com-
mitment to public justification: Rawls’ 
‘reflective equilibrium’ ‘overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls, 2001, pp.29-38 and 
2005, pp.133-72), or Sen’s ‘open’ (as 
opposed to ‘closed’) impartiality (Sen, 
2009, pp.124-52), together with the social, 
economic and cultural conditions that 
enable the free and equal participation of 
citizens in political self-determination. 
Deliberative fairness requires an 
exchange of public reasons, given the 
inevitable arguments about what ‘a fair 
go’ means in any particular case. For 
this reason a government may publish 
a ‘white paper’ or discussion document 
and receive submissions from the public. 
Parliament, through the select committee 
process, invites and hears submissions 
on legislation before the House. 
Parliamentary debates test the rationale 
for policy change. The media interview 
politicians and probe the reasons for 
doing this and not that.
The question ‘is it fair?’ is illuminated, 
Barry (1995, p.113) suggests, by phrasing 
it as, ‘could it reasonably be rejected?’ As 
Barry points out, appeal to public reason 
does not, however, restrict us merely to 
logical deduction in the public sphere, 
or to ostensibly ‘neutral’ or ‘value-free’ 
language and modes of reasoning and 
communication (cf. Bromell, 2011; 
Bradstock, 2010, 2012; Boston, 2013):
Historically, reason has been 
contrasted with authority, 
prescription, revelation, or coercion 
as a basis for the justification of 
institutions. In this context, ‘reason’ 
means reasoned argument, from 
premises that are in principle open 
Administrative consistency is part of what we 
examine when asking whether someone is getting 
‘a fair go’ in public policy.
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to everyone to accept. We can add 
a contemporary gloss to this by 
saying that these are premises which 
reasonable people, seeking to reach 
free, uncoerced agreement with 
others, would accept. (Barry, 1995, 
p.7)
Amartya Sen has similarly argued 
that:
Rationality is in fact a rather 
permissive discipline, which demands 
the test of reasoning, but allows 
reasoned self-scrutiny to take quite 
different forms, without necessarily 
imposing any great uniformity of 
criteria. If rationality were a church, 
it would be a rather broad church. 
(Sen, 2009, p.195)
Transactional fairness
Thirdly, transactional fairness is about 
how rules are operationalised and 
about playing by the rules once set. 
Implementation planning frequently 
involves communications with people 
who will be affected by new or changed 
rules. There may be a phase-in, or 
amnesty, period, but within a reasonable 
period of time we expect the same rules 
to apply to people in the same situation in 
the same way. Administrative consistency 
is part of what we examine when asking 
whether someone is getting ‘a fair go’ in 
public policy.
Playing by the rules once set also 
requires transparency and rights of review 
and appeal. This is why it is important 
to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary. It is why we have legislation like 
the Official Information Act 1982, the 
Local Government Official Information 
and Meetings Act 1987 and the Public 
Finance Act 1989. It is why we have the 
ombudsmen, the Office of the Auditor-
General, select committee hearings, the 
Privileges Committee of Parliament, 
parliamentary commissions and inquir-
ies, appeals and tribunals, parliamentary 
questions, televised parliamentary 
debates and the publication of Hansard. 
Transactional fairness is about keeping 
the buggers honest.
Transitional fairness
Fourthly, fair process requires reason-
ableness in how rules are changed or 
repealed, and, in particular, the timing of 
policy implementation. The 1988 Royal 
Commission on Social Policy reflected 
that:
Changes must be able to be 
implemented in an orderly 
manner which does not cause 
undue disruption to the lives of 
New Zealanders; nor should they 
undermine people’s legitimate 
expectations of security and 
certainty, and, too, of the role that 
government plays in their daily lives. 
It is also important that the reasons 
underlying the proposed changes are 
understood in the community. (Royal 
Commission on Social Policy, 1988, 
vol. 2, p.740)
Retirement income policy is one 
example. If a government were suddenly 
to change the policy settings for New 
Zealand Superannuation without any 
transitional period, a cohort of older 
people would be affected with no time or 
opportunity to prepare for changes to the 
amount of entitlements, criteria or age of 
eligibility. And any transition from a pay-
as-you-go (PAYGO) system to a save-as-
you-go (SAYGO) system would need to be 
managed carefully to avoid the transition 
generation being called on to pay twice: 
once for their parents’ generation, and 
once for their own retirement. As Ross 
Guest argued in a background paper 
prepared for the 2013 retirement income 
policy review:
People’s income tends to be highly 
variable over their lifetime. They 
prefer to have much less variability 
in their consumption. But in order 
to smooth their consumption they 
need to be able to make plans, which 
requires stable policy. Some change 
is inevitable but policy stability 
requires that change occur after due 
deliberation and that people have 
adequate time to adjust. (Guest, 2013, 
p.25)
Another example is tertiary education 
funding policy for student support. 
Changing the eligibility or amount of 
student allowances, or the terms and 
conditions of student loans, is bound to 
raise questions of transitional fairness 
and intergenerational equity, particularly 
where students have committed to 
a lengthy period of education and 
training.
Fair outcomes
‘A fair go’ in public policy requires more 
than fair process. Outcomes, or results, 
also matter and need to be seen to be fair, 
and especially our outcomes relative to 
one another. As Bräuer and Hanus note, 
‘Humans have a sense of fairness, i.e. an 
interest in the ideal of equity. This sense 
allows them to compare their own efforts 
and subsequent outcomes with those of 
others, and thus to evaluate and react to 
inequity ’(Brauer and Hanus, 2012, p.256, 
emphasis mine). 
Fair outcomes cannot, however, be 
defined in the abstract, in advance, once 
and for all. Rather, we need to arrive at a 
social evaluation of what ‘a fair go’ means 
in a specific context, at a particular point 
in time, through negotiated agreement 
(based on public reasoning) of alternatives 
that can be concretely realised and that 
take account of the values and priorities 
of the people involved, and of relativity 
or interpersonal comparison. As Harry 
Frankfurt opens his paper on ‘Equality as 
a moral ideal’: 
... we need to arrive at a social evaluation of 
what ‘a fair go’ means in a specific context, at 
a particular point in time, through negotiated 
agreement ... of alternatives ...
‘A Fair Go’ in Public Policy
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First man: ‘How are your children?’ 
Second man: ‘Compared to what?’ 
(Frankfurt, 1987, p.21)
I am thus arguing for Sen’s ‘realisation-
focused comparison’ through the exercise 
of practical judgement, rather than the 
sort of ‘transcendental institutionalism’ 
(Sen, 2009, introduction) whereby 
technocrats set out to create a ‘perfectly 
just’ system or arrive at ‘a single, uniquely 
rational, determinate answer’ (Gauss, 
2010, p.64). Moreover, as Klosko reminds 
us, ‘because of the inevitable imperfection 
of all social arrangements, a certain 
measure of unfairness should be expected 
and accepted’ (Klosko, 1992, p.66).
There are at least two ways we 
might proceed, both of which require 
comparative assessment of policy options 
against each other and the status quo. The 
first approach is to assess the substantive 
fairness of policy options by the extent to 
which they contribute, or might reasonably 
be expected to contribute, in a significant 
and measurable way to an overall increase 
in well-being and to improvement in the 
distribution of well-being. The second 
approach is to assess the substantive 
fairness of policy options against the 
extent to which we can reasonably expect 
them to actualise an agreed set of values or 
normative precepts.
These two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, and there is no reason 
why both might not be employed within 
a framework for comparative assessment 
and public deliberation. It is important, 
however, to keep any such framework at 
a relatively high level, and to avoid over-
specification that becomes restrictive or 
exclusionary.
Living Standards Framework
To adopt the first approach (a policy is 
substantively fair if it improves overall 
well-being and the distribution of well-
being), we might assess fair outcomes 
against the five dimensions of the 
Treasury’s Living Standards Framework 
(Treasury, 2013): economic growth, 
sustainability for the future, increasing 
equity, social infrastructure and reducing 
risks. The Treasury framework uses a 
capital stocks and flows approach (i.e., 
financial and physical capital, natural 
capital, social capital and human capital) 
to enable evidence-informed evaluation 
along these lines:
Economic growth
•	 Does	this	[policy	or	set	of	policies]	
improve the opportunities or 
incentives for higher incomes or 
greater economic growth?
•	 Does	this	remove	obstacles	that	
hinder resources moving to their 
most efficient use, or enhance the 
ability of people to take up new 
opportunities?
Sustainability for the future
•	 Does	this	impact	on	the	capital	
stocks for future use (e.g. physical 
capital, human capital, or the 
sustainability of the environment?)
Increasing equity
•	 Does	this	impact	on	the	distribution	
across society (both intra- and 
intergenerational)?
•	 Does	this	improve	opportunities	for	
people to improve their position?
Social infrastructure
•	 Does	this	impact	on	core	institutions	
that underpin our society (e.g. 
trust in the rule of law, democracy, 
Crown–Mäori relationship, cultural 
identity)?
•	 Does	this	impact	on	the	trust	and	
connections between people?
Reducing risks
•	 Does	this	impact	on	New	Zealand’s	
ability to withstand unexpected 
shocks?
•	 In	particular,	does	this	impact	on	
our macroeconomic position (debt, 
deficits, inflation, etc.)?
In other words, if there is agreement 
that the five dimensions of the Living 
Standards Framework broadly capture 
outcomes desired by a majority of New 
Zealanders, and that a particular policy 
is more likely than alternative policies 
to achieve better results across these 
five dimensions, then we might arrive 
at a working agreement that a policy is 
substantively ‘fair’. A particular policy, or 
set of policies, gives the people affected by 
it ‘a fair go’ when it improves their overall 
well-being, and the distribution of well-
being, now and in the future.
Values-based assessment
An alternative (or additional) approach is 
to assess the substantive fairness of a policy 
by reference to an agreed set of values or 
normative precepts. Proceeding in this way 
prompts explicit deliberation on the kind 
of society we want to create, inhabit and 
bequeath to the next generation, and the 
quality of life we wish to enjoy with one 
another now and in the future. Corning 
proposes a biosocial contract based on 
three normative precepts in his book on 
‘the fair society’:
•	 Goods	and	services	must	be	
distributed to each of us according 
to our basic needs (in this there must 
be equality).
•	 Surpluses	beyond	the	provisioning	of	
our basic needs must be distributed 
according to ‘merit’ (there must also 
be equity).
•	 In	return,	each	of	us	is	obligated	
to contribute proportionately to 
the collective survival enterprise in 
accordance with our ability (there 
must be reciprocity). (Corning, 2011, 
p.154)
Isbister (2001), in envisioning social 
and economic fairness, appeals to three 
dimensions of social justice, noting that 
these can and do conflict with each other: 
‘People deserve to be treated as equals, 
they deserve to be free, and they deserve 
Public policy should promote and facilitate 
‘reciprocity between the state and its citizens and 
among citizens themselves’ ... so that together we 
can live, live well and live better.
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to get the best they can out of their 
limited resources’ (Isbister, 2001, p.4).
Any selection of values or moral 
precepts for the sort of deliberative 
framework I am proposing will inevitably 
be somewhat arbitrary. The values set 
needs to be sufficiently ‘broad church’ to 
enable people with diverse conceptions of 
the good, and rival political theories, to 
engage with one another in ‘realisation-
focused comparison’. (Imagine, for 
example, a utilitarian, a libertarian, an 
egalitarian and a communitarian engaged 
in debate about which policy is most likely 
to give people ‘a fair go’.) The point is not 
that the values set be comprehensive, but 
that it resonate sufficiently with a broad 
range of protagonists to keep them ‘at the 
table’ long enough to arrive at a practical 
political consensus, so that decisions can 
be made and action occur. 
With this in mind, I propose four 
values for starters: freedom, equity, 
efficiency and reciprocity.
Freedom
Freedom can be understood both 
negatively (freedom from … oppression, 
discrimination, domination, humiliation 
or disrespect) and positively (freedom 
for … and freedom to … the capabilities 
to lead a life one has reason to value) 
(Berlin, 1969; Honneth, 2004; Sen, 1999, 
2009, pp.225-68; Pettit, 2008). Negative 
freedom requires us to reflect on whether 
a policy once operationalised intrudes to 
an unjustifiable extent on the liberty of 
the individual. Positive freedom requires 
us to factor in the social, economic and 
cultural conditions that enable people to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good. 
As Anderson notes:
Libertarians tend to identify freedom 
with formal, negative freedom; enjoy-
ing the legal right to do what one 
wants without having to ask anyone 
else’s permission and without interfer-
ence from others. This definition of 
freedom neglects the importance of 
having the means to do what one 
wants. (Anderson, 1999, p.315)
Critical enablers of positive freedom 
are access over a complete life to primary 
health care, education and training, 
appropriate housing, and opportunities 
to engage in meaningful paid work. This 
in turn implies that our pre-eminent 
social obligation in ‘a fair society’ is first 
to meet the basic needs of our fellow 
citizens (Corning, 2011, ch.7).
Equity
After basic needs are met and the enablers 
of democratic equality are assured, ‘a fair go’ 
requires equity in the sense of proportional 
equality in the distribution of costs and 
benefits. Equity does not mean treating 
everyone equally. (I have incorporated 
equality in the assessment of fair process: 
impartiality in the sense of equality of 
moral worth, and equal consideration of 
interests.) In considering the distribution 
of benefits and burdens, equity takes 
account of factors such as age (Atkinson, 
1983, ch.7), needs, luck (Dworkin, 1981), 
agreements (e.g. treaties), merit, effort 
and contribution. It allows for social 
recognition of unequal needs, unequal 
talents and abilities, unequal application of 
those abilities, and unequal contributions 
to the common good: ‘No doubt talented 
people do not deserve any moral credit for 
their native talents. But they do deserve 
moral credit for developing their talents 
and using them for our common benefit’ 
(Harsanyi, 2008, p.74, emphasis his).5
Fairness thus requires breadth of 
consideration (Hooker, 2005). It requires 
us to distinguish between different sources 
of inequality, rather than assuming that 
everyone should necessarily have, or 
get, the same. Equity also challenges 
us to consider the intergenerational 
accumulation of advantage and 
disadvantage, in order to ensure that 
future as well as present generations get 
‘a fair go’.  
Efficiency
Efficiency requires us to make the best 
use of available resources to achieve 
desired social ends (Isbister, 2001, p.21). 
Sometimes we talk about this as ‘cost 
effectiveness’ or ‘value for money’. A 
policy that expends public monies to little 
good effect, or that uses inefficient means 
to achieve a good that might have been 
achieved at less cost, does not deliver ‘a fair 
go’ either to the recipient of the service or 
to the taxpayers who fund it.
Including efficiency in the assessment 
of ‘a fair go’ protects against a risk 
highlighted by Kaplow and Shavell: 
‘virtually any method of evaluation that 
gives weight to notions of fairness will 
sometimes lead to choices that make all 
persons worse off ’ (2002, p.xviii). Indeed, 
there seems little to commend a policy 
option if there is another policy option 
that is likely to produce or contribute 
to greater well-being for everyone 
(Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011, p.235).6 
Zajac argues that:
all other factors being equal, one 
might consider economic efficiency 
to be a necessary fairness condition 
in any reasonable definition of 
fairness, while granting that, 
depending on the definition of 
fairness, some economically efficient 
allocations may be fairer than 
others.7 (Zajac, 1995, p.14)
Reciprocity
Reciprocity means give and take, over a 
complete life, with opportunities to be-
long, participate and contribute to the 
collective enterprise proportionately in ac-
cordance with our ability (Corning, 2011, 
p.154). Public policy should promote and 
facilitate ‘reciprocity between the state and 
its citizens and among citizens themselves’ 
(Conrad, 1981, p.19), so that together we 
can live, live well and live better. As Rawls 
puts it, ‘we are not to gain from the coop-
erative labors of others without doing our 
fair share’ (Rawls, 1971, p.112). 
Reciprocity does not, or ought not, 
occur only between ‘people like us’ or 
near neighbours within the immediate 
circle of our moral concern. Reciprocity 
challenges us to transcend tribalism, 
embrace our common humanity and 
expand the ‘we’ (Singer, 1982). In 
response to large-scale natural disasters, 
for example, we commonly witness 
reciprocity at work between, and not only 
within, nation states.
Reciprocity makes ‘a fair go’ sustain-
able. As Barry notes: ‘If I am motivated 
by a desire to behave fairly, I will want 
to do what the rules mandated by justice 
as impartiality require so long as enough 
other people are doing the same. Thus, 
people motivated by fairness reinforce 
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one another’s motives’ (Barry, 1995, 
p.51).
A matrix for comparative assessment
Table 1 summarises the approach I am 
proposing to the comparative assessment 
of policy options and the justification of ‘a 
fair go’ in public policy.
While assessment of options against 
each criterion should be quantified where 
possible, this matrix is offered not as a tool 
for technocrats to employ behind closed 
doors in a misguided attempt to design 
‘perfect systems’, but as a framework to 
guide public deliberation (‘things to think 
and talk about’). Quantification can and 
should inform public policy-making, but 
empirical analysis is not the cure for all 
policy ills.8 
Central to ‘a fair go’ in public policy is 
what Cohen (1991) calls the interpersonal 
test, or what Sen (2009, pp.xii–xiii) means 
by ‘public reasoning’. The approach 
outlined in this article intends to support 
citizen engagement and deliberation, 
through a public exchange of reasons, 
on practicable options to make our life 
together fairer than it is now:
the fact that fairness norms do not 
work like utopian thinkers would like 
them to work should not discourage 
us from trying to use them in the 
manner in which they actually do 
work. Others are free to toy with 
grandiose plans to convert our planet 
into a new Jerusalem, but bourgeois 
liberals like myself are content to aim 
at finding workable ways of making 
life just a little bit more bearable for 
everyone. (Binmore, 2008, p.332)
1 Cf. the Commission’s own excellent background paper on ‘the 
citizenship dividend’ (CFLRI, 2012).
2 As Rawls (2005, p.4) noted: ‘The political culture of a 
democratic society is always marked by a diversity of 
opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and 
this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism 
sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human 
reason at work within the background of enduring free 
institutions.’
3 For example, Milton Friedman’s ‘Fair versus free’ argues 
uncompromisingly for the priority of liberty: ‘There is a real 
role for fairness, but that role is in constructing general rules 
and adjudicating disputes about the rules, not in determining 
the outcomes of our separate activities’ (Friedman, 1992).
4 Analysis courtesy of Adrienne Fletcher, Knowledge Services, 
Ministry of Social Development. The Mana Party was formed 
in April 2011 following Hone Harawira’s resignation from the 
Mäori Party. The Progressive Party did not contest the 2011 
election.
5 In arguing (contra Rawls, 1971, pp.65, 101-04) that ‘justice 
itself requires us to reward superior performance in a suitable 
manner’, Harsanyi nevertheless concurs with Rawls that ‘we 
must not create needless economic and social inequalities’, 
and maintains that ‘such a policy would be fully compatible 
with significantly smaller economic and social inequalities 
than we have today’ (Harsanyi, 2008, p.76).
6 Fleurbaey and Maniquet do not treat efficiency as a criterion 
of fairness; rather, they introduce considerations of fairness 
into welfare economics as a useful way of addressing 
‘second-best policy problems’. In defining social ordering 
functions, efficiency is their central value (Fleurbaey and 
Maniquet, 2011, pp.22, 234).
7 Zajac notes (1995, pp.14, 77) that the relationship of Pareto 
efficiency to fairness is a crucial issue, for at least three 
reasons:
•	 strict	Pareto	optimality	rarely	exists:	almost	every	policy	
change generates some losers;
•	 if	a	Pareto-improving	move	were	to	be	identified	and	
implemented, how should gains from the exchange be 
divided?;
•	 Pareto	optimality	may	be	possible	in	a	static,	risk-free	
world with perfect information, but policy-making happens 
in a risky, dynamic world of imperfect information.
8 Chavas and Coggins (2003, p.226) report that, on their 
analysis, ‘while better information typically generates 
improved efficiency, it can also contribute to unfair 
allocations. It also stresses the effects of asymmetric 
information in the evaluation of equity.’
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Table 1: Things to think and talk about when assessing ‘a fair go’ in public policy
UNDERSTAND THE POLICY CONTEXT AND IDENTIFY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Context In what context has the question of ‘a fair go’ arisen? 
What is the policy problem? (What do we want to change or achieve?)
Relationships Who are the key ‘stakeholders’ (interested and affected parties)?
What is the nature of the relationship between them?
Are there existing agreements, contracts or treaties between the parties?
Time What time constraints do we face?
What time trends can we observe, and what are the implications of those trends 
now and in the future?
How are costs and benefits currently allocated between past, present and future 
generations?
MULTI-CRITERIA COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS
Criterion Status quo Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
FAIR PROCESS
Impartiality
Deliberative fairness
Transactional fairness
Transitional fairness
Assessment of procedural fairness
FAIR OUTCOMES
Assessed against the five dimensions of the Living Standards Framework
Economic growth
Sustainability for the future
Increasing equity
Social infrastructure
Reducing risks
And/or assessed against an agreed set of values, for example:
Freedom
Equity
Efficiency
Reciprocity
Assessment of outcome fairness
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
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